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New Zealand Foreign Policy 
Under the Clark Government: 
High Tide of Liberal 
Internationalism? 
David McCraw 
foreign policy of the current New Zealand government has strongly 
reflected the Labour Party's Liberal Internationalist ideology. Indeed, 
it is probable that this government has been the most Liberal 
Internationalist of all New Zealand Labour governments. The government 
of Prime Minister Helen Clark has placed considerable emphasis on the 
promotion of human rights internationally; it has strongly supported the 
role of the United Nations; it has championed nuclear disarmament and 
restructured the New Zealand armed forces to prioritize peacekeeping; and 
it has vigorously promoted free trade. Like all New Zealand governments, 
however, the Clark government's foreign policy has not always reflected its 
ideological predisposition, although the exceptions have been relatively few 
so far. 
The two major political parties in New Zealand, National and Labour, 
have differing outlooks on foreign affairs, which correspond quite well with 
the two classical approaches to international relations, Realism and Liberal 
Internationalism.1 The Labour Party's outlook may be characterized as 
basically Liberal Internationalist, whereas the National Party's is essentially 
Realist. When in government, these two different outlooks have influenced 
their respective parties' foreign policies considerably, although not in a 
consistent way, since governments are subject to many influences. Thus 
Labour governments have tended to have more Liberal Internationalist 
policies than Realist ones, and National governments the reverse. 
Liberal Internationalism is a school of thought about international 
relations that is mainly associated with the outlook of President Woodrow 
Wilson of the United States, although it is rooted in the ideas of 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Kant and Locke. The liberal approach to 
international relations begins with a belief in the common interests of the 
1 David McCraw, "Realism and Idealism in New Zealand's Foreign Policy," New Zealand 
International Review, vol. 23, no. 4 (July-August 1998), pp. 18-21. 
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world's people and the possibility of cooperation between nations for the 
common good. Obstacles to cooperation are thought to be the result of 
flawed governments or social systems. Wilson believed that peaceful relations 
between nations could be encouraged by the promotion of democracy, 
human rights and self-determination. Peace could also be advanced by the 
establishment and strengthening of international institutions, the promotion 
of disarmament and arms control, and the encouragement of free trade 
between nations. These propositions are still at the core of modern liberal 
thought, known as neoliberalism.2 
Liberal Internationalism is opposed by another school of thought known 
as Realism. Realism, like Liberal Internationalism, has a number of varieties, 
but they share some core propositions, such as the belief that relations 
between states are inherently conflictual, not cooperative, and that a state's 
priority must be the advancement of the national interest. Realists see the 
state's survival as the greatest national interest, and thus give great importance 
to security.3 Realists are more sceptical than Liberals about the prospects for 
international cooperation, and are thus less enthusiastic about international 
institutions.4 The promotion of human rights and democracy is much lower 
on the Realist agenda than on the Liberal one. Realists tend to believe that 
governments should not interfere in the internal business of other states.5 
The New Zealand Labour Party has traditionally been anti-militarist, 
enthusiastic about the United Nations, and concerned about human rights, 
all of which are elements of the Liberal Internationalist outlook. Labour has 
not, however, traditionally been a free-trade party, but in 1984 it changed 
course and has since championed free trade. Thus, the party now espouses 
all the major elements of Liberal Internationalism. 
The New Zealand National Party, in contrast, has always been concerned 
about New Zealand's security, has taken a low-key and pragmatic attitude to 
human rights issues in other countries, and has been less enthusiastic about 
the United Nations than Labour. This set of attitudes puts it closer to Realism 
than Liberal Internationalism.6 
At the 1999 election, the Labour Party came to power as the dominant 
party in a minority coalition formed with the Alliance Party. Labour retained 
2 Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The Neoliberal Challenge to Realist Theories of World Politics: An 
Introduction," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr, ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and 
the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St. Martins Press, 1995), pp. 9-14. 
3 Robert G. Gilpin, No One Loves a Political Realist in Benjamin Frankel, ed., Realism: 
Restatements and Renewal (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 7-8. 
4 Joseph M. Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Co-operation: A Realist Critique of the Newest 
Liberal Institutionalism," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory: 
Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St Martins Press, 1995) , p. 151 . 
5 See, for instance, George F. Kennan, "Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, vol. 64, no. 
2 (Winter 1985-86), p. 209. 
6 McCraw, "Realism and Idealism in New Zealand's Foreign Policy," pp. 19-20. 
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power after the 2002 election by forming another minority coalition with 
the Progressives. In both cases the coalition partners were ideologically close 
to Labour. The government was supported on confidence votes by 
sympathetic parties who were not formal allies. 
This Labour coalition government has probably been the most Liberal 
Internationalist of all New Zealand governments so far. This conclusion results 
from an examination of the main issues confronted by the Clark government 
in each area that Liberal Internationalism emphasizes: the promotion of 
human rights internationally, support for international institutions, anti- 
militarism and the encouragement of free trade. No other New Zealand 
government has been as consistently strong in all four areas. 
Human Rights, Democracy and Self-Determination 
Small states such as New Zealand are thought by some scholars to have a 
greater tendency than large ones to espouse moral or idealist causes in their 
foreign policies.7 In New Zealand, however, the promotion of human rights 
and democracy in the world has been associated almost exclusively with 
Labour Party governments.8 The first Labour government played a significant 
part in ensuring that human rights were included in the United Nations 
Charter, and a later party manifesto was to claim that the party's international 
affairs policy was to promote the International Declaration of Human Rights.9 
National party governments have tended to give a lower priority to human 
rights promotion. The party's foreign policy is focussed instead on New 
Zealand's economic and security interests. The minister of foreign affairs in 
the last National government declared that New Zealand could not afford 
to be hindered by a single ideological approach; nor should it take the moral 
high ground on every international issue of the day, or feel that it had some 
divine right to lecture the world.10 
Shortly after the current government came to power, Foreign Minister 
Phil Goff announced that the change in government would mean a change 
of priorities and emphases in foreign policy, and a month later Prime Minister 
Helen Clark was to state that one of the new priorities would be human 
rights issues.11 
? Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models," World Politics, vol. 
25, no. 4 (July 1973), p. 557. 
8 David J. McCraw, "New Zealand's Foreign Policy under National and Labour Governments: 
Variations on the 'Small State' Theme?" Pacific Affairs, vol. 67, no. 1 (Spring 1994), pp. 20-23. 9 Paul Lauren, A Very Special Moment in History : New Zealand s Role m the Evolution of 
International Human Rights," New Zealand International Review, vol. 23, no. 6 (November-December 
1998), pp. 2-9; New Zealand Labour Party, 1972 Election Manifesto (Wellington: New Zealand Labour 
Party, 1972), p. 29. 
10 Waikato Times, 11 February 1992, p. 1. 
1 1 Phil Goff, ^ Vhere to in Foreign Policy? and Helen Clark, New Zealand Foreign Policy: Pushing 
the Big Ideas," both in New Zealand International Review, vol. 25, no. 4 (July-August 2000), pp. 5-6. 
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The prime minister's declaration was put to the test almost immediately 
with regard to a crisis in Fiji. Fiji is one of New Zealand's closest neighbours 
and a fellow member of the Commonwealth and the Pacific Forum. In May 
2000, George Speight and armed supporters took the elected government 
of Fiji hostage because they were concerned about the power that Fijians of 
Indian descent had gained. It was a situation analogous to the one faced by 
the previous Labour government in New Zealand 13 years before, when 
Sitiveni Rabuka had mounted a military coup against the Fijian government 
for much the same reason. As the Lange government did in 1987, the Clark 
government at first voiced support for the reinstatement of the overthrown 
Fijian government, led by Mahendra Choudry.12 It criticized the decision of 
the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs to replace the Choudry government with 
an interim administration. However, like the Lange government, the Clark 
government quickly accepted that the status quo ante would not be restored. 
New Zealand's diplomatic response was to cut military ties with Fiji, and to 
ban people associated with Speight from entering New Zealand. 
When, as in 1987, the Pacific Forum made no move to influence events in 
Fiji, the Clark government decided that this time it would not accept regional 
inaction. In conjunction with Samoa, Goff initiated a forum foreign ministers' 
meeting in Apia to draw up a blueprint for future forum action in similar 
circumstances. At the subsequent Pacific Forum meeting in October 2000, 
Helen Clark led the charge for the forum to commit itself to upholding 
democratic principles. Unlike her Labour predecessor, she was unwilling to 
defer to the preference of forum members to not interfere in the internal 
affairs of neighbouring states and to refrain from criticizing them publicly: 
the so-called "Pacific Way." Clark wanted the forum to adopt a new way - 
essentially, to defend Liberal Internationalist values. Assisted by Australia, 
Samoa and Kiribati, Clark was able to achieve this goal by getting the forum 
to agree to the Biketawa Declaration, which commits the forum to action to 
uphold democracy in the region. The Fijian interim prime minister attended 
the forum in a bid to head off the New Zealand and Australian initiative 
with the aid of Melanesian allies, but failed. Clark had made it clear that she 
would not attend any future forums if this one would not commit itself to 
the defence of democracy in the future.13 
As soon as democracy returned to Fiji, in the shape of the August 2001 
elections, New Zealand's relationship with Fiji improved. When the 
Commonwealth decided in December 2001 that Fiji should be readmitted 
to membership of the Commonwealth, New Zealand lifted its restrictions 
on contact with the Fijian government. 
12 New Zealand Herald, 22 May 2000, p. A3. 
13 New Zealand Herald, 31 October 2000, p. Al. 
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The Fiji crisis was the Clark government's first major test in the area of 
upholding democracy and human rights, and it performed well. Indeed, 
this government took a more robust stance on Fiji than the Lange Labour 
government had in 1987. Lange had been concerned about alienating Fiji 
and the rest of the Pacific Forum nations. The Lange government had also 
been less than robust on human rights issues in Iran and East Timor.14 
The Clark government also proved to be a strong advocate of 
Commonwealth action against Zimbabwe for its abuse of democratic norms 
and human rights. After the Mugabe government passed laws to stifle dissent 
prior to the 2002 presidential election, Goff urged the forthcoming 
Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting to suspend Zimbabwe from 
the Commonwealth to demonstrate "the utter unacceptability of the 
increasingly dictatorial and abusive regime of Robert Mugabe."15 In this 
attitude, New Zealand was in line with Britain, Australia and Canada, but 
out of step with most of the African Commonwealth nations. 
When the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (comprising 
Australia, Nigeria and South Africa) decided against suspension prior to the 
Zimbabwe lection, the New Zealand government expressed disappointment 
and called for smart sanctions to be imposed on Zimbabwe's elite. Helen 
Clark said that if Mugabe were returned to power in the election, New Zealand 
would act alone if need be to impose measures against Zimbabwe.16 She 
considered it unfortunate that African leaders were unwilling to take action 
against Zimbabwe, and said that the Commonwealth looked silly in failing 
to act against abuses of human rights. 
After the election, which Mugabe won, Zimbabwe was suspended from 
Commonwealth meetings, although not from the Commonwealth itself. The 
New Zealand government then moved to put in place targeted sanctions 
against members of the Mugabe government. 
When Zimbabwe's one-year suspension from Commonwealth meetings 
expired in March 2003, the Labour government in New Zealand spoke out 
for the suspension to be continued, in the face of Nigeria's and South Africa's 
desire to see the suspension lifted. The suspension of Zimbabwe was extended 
until the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in December 2003, 
when it was decided that Zimbabwe should remain suspended indefinitely. 
Mugabe then announced that his country would leave the Commonwealth. 
Helen Clark said that Zimbabwe's leaving was not a disaster: the disaster 
would have been if the suspension had been lifted.17 
14 David J. McCraw, "Idealism and Realism in the Foreign Policy of the Fourth Labour 
Government," Political Science, vol. 53, no. 2 (December 2001), pp. 27-28. 
15 New Zealand Herald, 12 January 2002, p. A7. 
16 New Zealand Herald, 5 March 2002, p. Al . 
17 New Zealand Herald, 9 December 2003, p. Al. 
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During the Labour government's first term, it also tried to advance the 
cause of human rights in Tibet. This was a delicate task for the government 
because New Zealand had an important trade relationship with China, the 
country denying the Tibetans their rights. In Parliament in June 2000, Phil 
Goff said that the government had consistently urged China to enter into 
dialogue with the Dalai Lama, the exiled Tibetan religious leader, and to 
consider ways in which the Tibetan people could be allowed to better express 
their identity.18 When Goff broached the issue of China's negotiating with 
the Dalai Lama with the Chinese foreign minister in late 2000, he was invited 
to visit Tibet, which he did in June 2001. The Labour government said that 
it did not challenge China's territorial integrity or its right to keep governing 
Tibet. Goff said that it would be pointless to challenge China's sovereignty 
in current circumstances. Instead, New Zealand should concentrate on 
encouraging China to give the Tibetan people more freedom to run their 
own affairs while protecting their language, culture and religion: "About all 
we can do is ask China to make that word autonomous in its Tibetan 
Autonomous Region have greater meaning in the practical sense."19 
Goff spent four days in Tibet and at the end of it said he had raised 
concerns with Tibetan officials over restrictions on freedom of speech, harsh 
treatment of dissidents, restrictions on religion, and the need for greater 
autonomy to protect Tibetan culture and language: "In our view, long prison 
sentences for peaceful expression of a political view is contrary to 
international human rights standards."20 
In May 2002, the Dalai Lama visited both Australia and New Zealand. 
The Chinese government, through its foreign minister, told the New Zealand 
government that it was undesirable that cabinet ministers meet the Dalai 
Lama. Nevertheless, the New Zealand prime minister and foreign affairs 
minister welcomed the Dalai Lama. This was in contrast to the Australian 
government, which refused to meet the Tibetan leader. Goff said that the 
New Zealand ministers met the Dalai Lama in his capacity as a spiritual leader. 
He acknowledged that the Chinese government preferred him not to meet 
the Dalai Lama, but said that this was a decision for New Zealanders to take.21 
Even in the foreign policy of a Liberal Internationalist government, 
human rights cannot take priority over other considerations all the time. 
New Zealand's most important national interest is the expansion of its export 
markets, yet many of its trading partners are not democracies. Inevitably, 
some of their internal practices will not accord with Liberal values. The 
government's efforts to secure free-trade agreements with various Asian 
countries have sparked criticism that New Zealand is forming relationships 
18 New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 585 (29 June 2000) , pp. 3307-3308. 
19 New Zealand Herald, 1 June 2001 , p. A9. 
W New Zealand Herald, 5 June 2001, p. A7. 
21 New Zealand Herald, 28 May 2002, p. A2. 
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with countries whose human rights records are poor. The prospect of the 
Labour government's negotiating a free-trade agreement with China, for 
instance, was criticized in April 2004 by the Green Party's co-leader, Rod 
Donald, who said that unless New Zealand could force China to improve its 
record, especially concerning its use of child labour, the government should 
negotiate no further: "No country should put the economy ahead of human 
rights and environmental standards."22 Trade Minister Jim Sutton said that 
the government would raise the issue of China's labour and environmental 
standards during negotiations, but that human rights issues were not a 
condition of the talks, and "I don't think we could expect single-handed to 
change China's policy in those regards."23 
Shortly after the government began negotiations with China in December 
2004, Rod Donald asked the minister of foreign affairs in Parliament why 
New Zealand was in talks with China when the latter's human rights record 
was poor. Phil Goff replied that if New Zealand stopped trading with countries 
it did not entirely agree with, New Zealand's living standards would suffer.24 
The prime minister had earlier suggested that a free-trade agreement 
with the ASEAN countries would actually have a positive effect on human 
rights in the region. Forging closer ties, she said, would promote human 
rights.25 
International institutions 
Small states are alleged to give greater importance to international 
institutions in their foreign policies than larger powers,26 and it is true that 
all New Zealand governments have been conscientious supporters of the 
United Nations. This bipartisanship, however, conceals a difference in the 
parties' enthusiasm for the organization. For Labour, support for the United 
Nations is at the very centre of its foreign policy, as Liberal Internationalists 
believe that peace can be promoted by strengthening the authority of 
international institutions. The first Labour government was a fervent 
supporter of the League of Nations and played a role in the foundation of 
the United Nations.27 All subsequent Labour governments have been 
enthusiastic supporters of the institution. For the National Party, however, 
support is tempered by a Realist scepticism about the efficacy of the United 
Nations, and a preference to rely more on allies and friends. National Party 
22 Bob Edlin, "Trade, not tirades, is path to modernising China," Independent, 21 April 2004, p. 8. 
23 Edlin, "Trade, not tirades." 
24 New Zealand Herald, 10 December 2004, p. A4. 
25 Radio New Zealand Newswire, 30 November 2004, 05:30. 
26 East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior," p. 557, p. 560. 
27 David McCraw, "The Advent of Liberal Internationalism in New Zealand's Foreign Policy," 
Political Science, vol. 55, no. 2 (December 2003), pp. 47-50 and 57-58. 
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leader Bill English would say in 2002, concerning the Iraq crisis: "As important 
as the United Nations is as an international force, there are other 
international relationships that for us are more strategic."28 
The Clark government has been a strong promoter of the role of the 
United Nations, and it has been quite willing to criticize New Zealand's friends 
and allies when they have failed to give the United Nations the support that 
the government believed they should. In February 2000, for instance, Phil 
Goff criticized the United States for failing to pay its outstanding UN bill of 
$1.6 billion: "New Zealand, a country which has always paid its fees on time 
and without conditions, questions the equity of larger countries with 
substantial financial resources not pulling their weight."29 The United States, 
he said, was the key defaulter. 
The following September, the minister of foreign affairs and trade 
criticized the Australian government for threatening noncooperation in the 
future with United Nations human rights investigators. The Australian move 
had come after a United Nations Committee on Economic, Socialand 
Cultural Rights had issued a report indicating deep concern over Aboriginal 
disadvantages in employment, health, housing and education. Goff urged 
the Australians to "stay engaged" with the United Nations rather than 
downgrading cooperation. He said that since New Zealand and Australia 
were signatories to United Nations treaties and the standards they established, 
they had to be open to listening to criticism.30 
Even when the Labour Coalition government disagreed with United 
Nations policy, it indicated a willingness to comply with the relevant rulings. 
In April 2000, the government announced that it was no longer in favour of 
United Nations trade sanctions against Iraq. These, Goff said, were hurting 
ordinary Iraqis and not the ruling elite. Goff wanted better targeted "smarter 
sanctions" that would include the freezing of assets and bank accounts 
overseas, and a ban on foreign travel. The minister of foreign affairs and 
trade indicated, however, that New Zealand would remain bound by trade 
sanctions as long as they were United Nations policy.31 
New Zealand's most tangible means of supporting the role of the United 
Nations has been its participation in United Nations peacekeeping forces. 
The Labour-led government responded positively to several United Nations 
requests to extend the commitment of New Zealand troops to the 
peacekeeping force in East Timor, despite the strain on the army of keeping 
a full battalion there. The government also contributed soldiers to a British- 
28 Bill English, "Doing the Right Things for the Right Reasons," New Zealand International Review, 
vol. 27, no. 5 (September-October 2002), p. 6. 
29 New Zealand Herald, 24 February 2002, p. A5. 
30 Sunday Star-Times, 3 September 2000, p. A2. 
31 Audrey Young, Time to End Misery of Iraq blockade says NZ, New Zealand Herald, 19 Apnl 
2000, p. A5. 
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led peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. This force, consisting of units from 
15 nations, was authorized by the Security Council. In 2003, after a United 
Nations resolution urged members to help with the reconstruction of Iraq, 
New Zealand sent some 60 army engineers to that country, as well as mine 
clearance experts. 
The Labour coalition government's commitment to the United Nations 
was probably most clearly demonstrated during the 2003 crisis over Iraq, 
when New Zealand refused to support the United States, Britain and Australia 
in their military intervention in Iraq, because such action had not been 
authorized by the United Nations. 
Before the American and British intervention, the Clark government's 
position had been that the United Nations weapons inspectors, who were 
trying to determine whether Iraq had disposed of its weapons of mass 
destruction, should be given time to finish their work. If, after that, the United 
Nations authorized military action against Iraq, New Zealand would 
contribute medical or logistical support.32 The Green Party attacked this 
stance, saying that even if the United Nations Security Council authorized 
force, this would not make it right. Clark retorted that "you can't flick 
multilateralism on and off when it suits you and say you don't want it when 
you don't get the result you want."33 She said that New Zealand had always 
fulfilled its obligations as a "conscientious" member of the United Nations. 
Later, she would say: "If we are going to pick and choose Security Council 
resolutions we uphold, then we contribute to undermining the 
organisation."34 
For Helen Clark, support for the premier international institution was 
more important than anti-militarism when these two elements of Liberal 
Internationalism clashed. It was also more important than advancing the 
cause of human rights by deposing Saddam Hussein. When the United States 
and Britain attacked Iraq in late March 2003, without specific United Nations 
authorization, Prime Minister Clark said, on 17 March, thatshe did not accept 
the argument that an invasion of Iraq could be justified by its liberation 
from Saddam Hussein: "A regime change is not something that the UN is 
mandated to do." She also said that it was a very serious thing to thumb 
one's nose at the Security Council.35 
In Parliament, Clark expressed "profound regret" that "close friends" had 
chosen to act outside the Security Council and thus set a dangerous 
precedent.36 After the leader of the National Party suggested that New 
32 New Zealand Herald, 22 January 2003, p. A7. 
33 New Zealand Herald, 29 January 2003, p. Al. 
34 Gordon Campbell, A Rock and a Hard Place, New Zealand Listener, vol. 187, no. 3277 (1-7 
March 2003), p. 20. 
35 Waikato Times, 17 March 2003, p. 2. 
3b New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, vol. 608 ( 1 8 March 2003) , p. 41 1 1 . 
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Zealand should at least contribute some medical assistance, Clark declared 
that the government would not be assisting a war for which there was no 
case at this time: "Without he United Nations, multilateralism and respect 
for the international rule of law, the world's prospects would be bleak indeed." 
A return to an earlier era, where might was right, was not in New Zealand's 
interests, nor in the interests of the international community at large. If all 
nations of goodwill did not move rapidly to support a reassertion of the 
authority of the United Nations, then others might well feel able to use that 
precedent.37 Clark said that after the war, New Zealand would contribute to 
any United Nations peacekeeping force in Iraq, but not one organized by 
the United States only.38 
Anti-militarism and disarmament 
A small state has been defined as one that cannot "obtain security primarily 
by use of its own capabilities,"39 and certainly New Zealand governments 
have always considered New Zealand to be in that category. Historically, 
governments of all stripes have seen New Zealand's isolated geographic 
position as a vulnerability, and sought to counter it by alliances with friendly 
"great powers," first Britain and then the United States. The first, second 
and third Labour governments all adopted this strategy, even though their 
Liberal Internationalist ideology opposed security alliances and favoured 
disarmament. This came about because of the inability of the United Nations 
to provide the system of universal collective security that Labour preferred. 
National Party governments, on the other hand, have been enthusiastic 
supporters of New Zealand's alliances and have given them high priority in 
their foreign policies. 
It is true, nevertheless, that in the postwar era, defence has never had the 
same importance as it has had in neighbouring Australia; this has been 
attributed to New Zealand's greater remoteness from the presumed source 
of threats, Asia, and the fact that it is shielded by a well-armed ally, Australia.40 
As the last perceived threat in the region, from a militant China, faded away 
in the 1970s, the underlying ideological differences of the major parties on 
defence began to assert themselves. The fourth Labour government of 1984- 
1990 sacrificed New Zealand's security alliance with the United States, 
ANZUS, in order to retain a disarmament policy that its ally opposed. This 
disarmament policy was a ban on the entry into New Zealand ports of nuclear- 
armed and nuclear-powered ships. Labour's reasoning was that the greatest 
37 Sunday Star-Times, 23 March 2003, p. C3. 
38 New Zealand Herald, 25 March 2003, p. A5. 
39 R. I. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University, 1 968) , p. 29. 
40 Hugh White, "Refocusing the dialogue on strategic co-operation," New Zealand International 
Review, vol. 28, no. 1 (January-February 2003), p. 3. 
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threat New Zealand now faced was the nuclear-arms race.41 This government, 
however, still wished to retain New Zealand's security link with Australia. 
The current Labour-dominated government has demonstrated a Liberal 
Internationalist anti-militarism by radically restructuring New Zealand's 
defence force, and in the process it has further loosened the security ties 
between New Zealand and its friends and allies. 
The Labour-led government moved early to restructure the defence force 
to prioritize peacekeeping and civil defence tasks. This plan was based on a 
report by Parliament's foreign affairs and defence select committee, which 
recommended that since no political party was willing to spend more on 
defence, New Zealand should rationalize its capabilities along the lines of 
those that were currently most useful.42 Thus, instead of trying to fund 
inadequately a broad-based range of air, sea and land capabilities, New 
Zealand should have a more focussed and viable force for the same money. 
Since peacekeeping and civil defence tasks were what the military had been 
doing most of in recent years, and since those tasks were also the most 
congenial to Labour's anti-militarist outlook, the Labour government decided 
to prioritize the capacities that best supported those roles. Thus the Army 
was to be better funded at the expense of the combat arms of the Air Force 
and Navy. Accordingly, the Labour government, while funding new 
equipment for the Army, cancelled the previous government's deal with the 
United States for new strike fighters and then, a year later, disbanded the 
existing air combat arm of the Air Force: two squadrons of Skyhawks. The 
government also cancelled the upgrade of the radar of the Orion maritime 
surveillance aircraft, which meant an end to their anti-submarine capability. 
Finally, the government announced that it would buy no more frigates. When 
the most elderly frigate was retired in 2005, the government would look to 
replace it with a multi-role patrol vessel, rather than a combat frigate. 
These moves, all of which downgraded the fighting capacity of the Air 
Force and the Navy, concerned both the United States and Australia, which 
hoped that New Zealand would maintain forces capable of augmenting their 
own in coalition operations in the region or further afield. The Australian 
Defence White Paper of 2000 noted: "We would regret any decision by New 
Zealand not to maintain at least some capable air and naval combat 
capabilities. Such forces would allow a more significant contribution to be 
made to protecting our shared strategic interests, especially in view of the 
essentially maritime nature of our strategic environment."43 
41 David Lange, "Facing Critical Choices," New Zealand International Review, vol. 12, no. 4 (July- 
August 1987), p. 2. 
^ Inquiry into Dejence Beyond ZUUU, Report or the foreign Anairs, Defence and Irade Select 
Committee, Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives 1999, 1. 4D., p. 59. 
43 Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force (Canberra: Commonwealth of Australia, 2000), p. 42. 
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The Clark government was apparently not influenced by the views of its 
allies. After the decision to cancel the upgrade of the Orions in August 2000, 
the prime minister admitted that the Cabinet had ignored warnings from 
foreign affairs and defence officials that such an action would upset New 
Zealand's defence partners.44 Defence minister Burton conceded that Australia 
had wanted the refit of the aircraft with sophisticated submarine detection 
electronics to proceed. The Australian defence minister publicly expressed 
"disappointment" at the decision. These actions contradicted the government's 
publicly expressed defence policy objective of maintaining a close defence 
partnership with Australia in pursuit of common security interests.45 
The Labour government believed that not only could New Zealand not 
afford the equipment necessary to support the strategies of its allies, but 
there was no need to do so because those strategies were wrongly conceived. 
For Clark, regional security was best achieved by non-military means. In 1994, 
she had said that New Zealand's security would rest on relationships built 
with Asia-Pacific nations.46 The Government's Defence Framework paper 
elaborated on this by saying that New Zealand could best contribute to 
regional stability by promoting comprehensive security through a range of 
initiatives, including diplomacy, trade links, development assistance and the 
pursuit of arms control and disarmament.47 
Clark and the Labour Party are also declared supporters of the Liberal 
Internationalist concept of common security, which is based on the premise 
that no country can make itself militarily secure without creating insecurity 
in others, so that building up armed forces is counterproductive and wasteful. 
True security can only be found in co-operation with other countries, rather 
than in competition with them. Whereas collective security (previously 
favoured by Labour) aims at deterring others through the threat of combined 
force, common security tries to move away from the use of force altogether.48 
The 1993 election manifesto of the Labour Party pledged Labour to work to 
promote common security in the Pacific region, realizing that past military 
alliances were no longer an adequate basis for meeting the region's post- 
Cold War needs.49 
The Labour government was initially very wary of joining Australia in 
sending troops to the Solomon Islands in 2003 after law and order broke 
44 John Armstrong and Greg Ansley, "Overseas Backlash as Orions sidelined," New Zealand Herald, 
24 August 2000, p. Al. 
4o Armstrong and Ansley, p. Al . 
*> Waikato limes, T5 March 1994, p. 7. 
47 The New Zealand Ministry of Defence , The Government 's Defence Policy Framework, New Zealand 
government, June 2000, p. 2. 
48 Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, Common security: A Blueprint 
for Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), particularly pp. 8-10. 
49 New Zealand Labour Party, Jobs. Growth. Health: Labour sManifesto jor New Zealand (Wellington: 
MMSCLtd, 1993), p. 128. 
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down there. After the Solomons government asked for help, Australia was 
ready to lead a rescue mission and asked New Zealand to participate. The 
New Zealand government was uneasy about being seen to intervene like 
"big brother" in the affairs of a small Pacific neighbour: the parallels with 
Iraq were too close for comfort. Cabinet eventually agreed to send police 
and logistics personnel from the military, but initially declined to send 
infantry like the Australians. New Zealand told Australia that it would keep 
an infantry company on standby to send if the need arose.50 A month later, 
when Australia requested the troops, they were sent. The Australian minister 
of foreign affairs later publicly mentioned New Zealand's hesitation, and its 
concern that Australia was throwing its weight around in the Pacific. He said 
that New Zealand and other Pacific nations were now comfortable with 
Australia's role.51 
Liberal Internationalism, however, has not always dictated Labour's policy. 
After the terrorist attacks on New York in September 2001, Clark offered the 
United States a New Zealand special forces unit for any military intervention 
in Afghanistan, an offer that was accepted. New Zealand SAS troops joined 
the forces of several other nations for a tour of duty in Afghanistan in late 
2001. In 2004, it was announced that the unit would return to Afghanistan 
for another tour. At the Americans' request, the Labour government also 
dispatched a frigate to the Persian Gulf to join a multinational naval task 
force trying to interdict the movements of terrorists. 
These two policies reflect Realist decisions to further the national interest. 
American officials had warned the government privately that its response to 
the September 1 1 attacks would be treated as a touchstone for future relations 
between the countries. There was also the fact that the government was 
hoping to negotiate a free-trade agreement with the United States.52 
The Labour government, however, has made it plain that it has no interest 
in resuming a formal military relationship with the United States. Shortly 
after becoming the Labour Party's leader in late 1993, Clark said that the 
ANZUS alliance was "out of time'' and had "no relevance to New Zealand's 
security needs today."53 Even if the obstacles to better defence relations with 
the United States were removed by a resolution of the ship ban dispute, she 
said, Labour would not be interested in resuming a defence relationship.54 
50 Tracy Watkins, "Anzac tension over Solomons," Stuff- Dominion Post - Local News 1 0 November 
2003, p.l, www.stuff.co.nz , retrieved (31 March 2005) from a library newspaper database run by 
Independent Newspapers Ltd called Newztext Plus, which is accessible at http://io.knowledge- 
basket.co.nz/magz/007-01 .html. 
51 Tracy Watkins, "Downer digs at NZ Solomons hesitancy," Dominion Post, 22 December 2003 
(second edition), p. 2 
52 John Armstrong, "Blunt U.S. hint led to offer of troops," New Zealand Herald, 8 January 2002, 
p.l. 
53 Waikato Times, 23 March 1994, p. 7. 
54 New Zealand Herald, 18 April 1994, p. 1. 
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Clark has indicated that her government has no intention of modifying, 
let alone repealing, the law prohibiting port visits by nuclear-armed and 
nuclear-propelled ships, which sparked the rift with the United States. Even 
though the United States has removed all tactical nuclear weapons from its 
surface ships, the policy is too symbolic of Labour's commitment to nuclear 
disarmament o be modified. Clark believes that being nuclear-free has been 
a great asset to many new relationships that New Zealand has built, and has 
enabled New Zealand to take a leadership role on nuclear disarmament.55 
During 2002, the deputy prime minister admitted that the ships ban was an 
obstacle to the conclusion of a free-trade agreement with the United States, 
but there would nevertheless be no change in the policy.56 
The Clark government's emphasis on nuclear disarmament reflects a 
major element of Liberal Internationalism. Addressing the United Nations 
in her first year, the prime minister said that New Zealand's "key 
preoccupations" in the United Nations in coming years would be on issues 
of disarmament and security, human rights, the environment and 
development: "Our passion for nuclear disarmament is well-known." Clark 
said that years of working with others for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
had paid off, and now the goal was nothing less than the total elimination of 
nuclear weapons.57 A start had been made at the Non-proliferation Treaty 
Renewal Conference in May 2000, when New Zealand and its six allies in the 
New Agenda Coalition, which had been formed in 1998 to press for total 
nuclear disarmament, had presented the nuclear powers with an agenda of 
desirable actions to be taken. These included a no-first-use of nuclear weapons 
declaration, and a de-activation of nuclear weapons. A small success was 
gained when the five nuclear powers on the Security Council committed 
themselves to the goal of complete elimination of their armaments, although 
without any hint of a timetable.58 The same year Brazil and New Zealand 
presented the United Nations with a resolution calling for the establishment 
of a Southern Hemisphere Nuclear Weapons Free zone. It won overwhelming 
support. 
Free Trade 
Small nations are thought by scholars to give economic matters greater 
priority in their foreign policies than larger nations do.59 In New Zealand's 
case, it is true that the most important national interest is the protection 
55 Tracy Watkins, "Nuclear fallout," Dominion Post, 6 April 2002, p. 13. 
56 New Zealand Herald, 7 October 2002, p. A6. 
57 Record: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, vol. 9, no. 3 (September-October 2000), p. 11. 
58 Record: New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade, vol. 9, no. 3 (September-October 2000), p. 85. 
59 East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior," p. 560. 
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and expansion of the country's export trade, and that all governments are 
subject to this imperative. Not only do exports account for about a quarter 
of the country's gross national product, but these exports consist largely of 
agricultural products which face formidable protective barriers in many 
countries of the world. Both of New Zealand's major political parties are 
committed to seeking the lowering of trade barriers in other countries, and 
since New Zealand's own tariffs were drastically reduced after 1984, both 
parties now support free trade. 
It was a National Party government that pioneered New Zealand's 
conversion to free trade by concluding a free-trade agreement with Australia 
in 1983. National, like Labour, had previously protected New Zealand's 
manufacturers. The Realist outlook supports any trade strategy that is in the 
national interest, although its emphasis on self-reliance would seem to favour 
protectionism. However, if free trade is judged the best vehicle for enhancing 
the nation's economic well being, then Realists would support that. National 
now sees free trade as being in New Zealand's national interest. 
Liberal Internationalism believes that free trade between countries 
contributes to peace as well as increases wealth. Although historically the 
New Zealand Labour Party has not favoured this element of Liberal 
Internationalism because of the threat it posed to employment in protected 
industries, the fourth Labour government in 1984 became a convert to free 
trade as a way of making New Zealand's economy more efficient. 
The Clark government, which is New Zealand's fifth Labour-dominated 
government, has been notable for its efforts to secure bilateral free trade 
deals with a number of countries around the Pacific. This strategy appears 
to be a contradiction for a Liberal Internationalist government that is 
committed to multilateralism in trade as in other things, but the government 
does not see it as such. In the Clark government's eyes, these bilateral deals 
are both a "hurry up" to multilateral negotiations and a fallback in case 
those negotiations fail. Trade minister Jim Sutton indicated in 2003 that 
New Zealand's focus remained firmly on the Doha round of the World Trade 
Organization negotiations. The main reason that the government had been 
pushing bilateral deals along was "because it adds momentum to the 
multilateral negotiations." People would worry about being left out "and 
that concentrates their minds."60 The Doha round, however, broke down in 
September of that year, adding impetus to fallback arrangements. Another 
driver of bilateralism has been the relative failure of the regional economic 
organization, APEC, to live up to its promise of freeing up trade. Helen 
Clark came to power believing that APEC had run out of steam as an 
instrument to hasten trade liberalization and that agreements between 
60 Bob Edlin, "Pragmatic government elevates China in trading priorities," Independent, 21 January 
2004, p. 8. 
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smaller groups of countries that wanted to move faster towards the goal 
were the way to go.61 
The pursuit of bilateral trade agreements is a Realist policy, because 
securing preferential access is in New Zealand's national interest if 
multilateral negotiations fail. Despite Clark's belief that free trade will advance 
the cause of human rights, the prime motivation for the policy is not the 
Liberal Internationalist one of advancing peace, but the Realist one of 
increasing New Zealand's economic security. 
The government's principal targets for bilateral agreements were 
Singapore and Chile, both of which had open economies like New Zealand's 
and were also disappointed with the progress made on trade liberalization 
by multinational and regional organizations. In 1999, New Zealand, under a 
National Party government, had suggested such an agreement to Singapore. 
Although both governments were doubtful that there would be much direct 
economic benefit to either from an agreement, it was thought that it might 
have political benefits in stirring interest among other potential partners.62 
If enough APEC economies joined in, it might force the others to come 
along for fear of being disadvantaged. 
An agreement with Singapore on a Closer Economic Partnership took 
only a year to negotiate and was signed in November 2000. Although New 
Zealand had hoped that Chile would be a third partner in the agreement, 
such a deal has proved more problematic than the one with Singapore. The 
main sticking point has been Chile's reluctance to expose its dairy farmers 
to competition from more efficient New Zealand producers. Nevertheless, 
negotiations have continued, and at the APEC summit in 2002, New Zealand, 
Singapore and Chile announced their intention of having a comprehensive 
three-nation free-trade deal signed by October 2004. 
The 2002 APEC summit also saw the initiation of talks about a New Zealand 
economic partnership with Mexico. The two governments agreed to study 
the benefits of a free-trade agreement. Mexico is New Zealand's biggest 
trading partner in Latin America and is already in a free-trade association 
with the United States and Canada. 
The biggest prize in the Labour government's bilateral strategy is a free- 
trade deal with the United States, which is estimated to be worth NZ$1 billion 
a year to New Zealand.63 Clark broached the subject with President Bush at 
the 2001 APEC summit and received encouragement that such an agreement 
61 John Armstrong, "Clark questions Apec's Asia-Pacific relevance," New Zealand Herald, 11 
November 2000, p. A4. 
6^ Stephen Hoadley, Negotiating Free Trade: the New Zealand-Singapore CEP Agreement (Wellington: 
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 2002) , pp. 21-22. 
63 John Armstrong, Anzac spmt evaporates on US trade, New Zealand Herald, 17 December 
2001, p. A6. 
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might be possible once the president had received the pending congressional 
authority to conclude such deals. New Zealand knew that both Chile and 
Singapore were already negotiating for a deal and that Australia was intent 
on opening negotiations. The Labour government believed that New 
Zealand's competitive position in the American market could be undermined 
if Australia got superior access to that market. It hoped that New Zealand 
could make a joint approach with Australia, but found the Australians 
reluctant to involve New Zealand in their negotiations.64 The Australians 
thought New Zealand would bring a fresh set of difficulties to the table which 
would only complicate Australian efforts. 
In October 2002, however, there appeared to be a breakthrough when 
the Bush Administration's trade representative announced his backing for 
an agreement with New Zealand to complement the one being negotiated 
with Australia. The announcement came after an intensive eight-week 
lobbying campaign in Washington, headed by New Zealand's ambassador to 
the United States. It also followed a few days after Prime Minister Clark had 
announced the commitment of a New Zealand frigate to the Persian Gulf to 
help in the interdiction of Al Qaeda members. 
Helen Clark herself flew to the United States in December 2002 to help 
the process along. It was critical, she said, that New Zealand took every 
opportunity to push its case in the United States: the prize was no less than 
a special working partnership with the world's largest economy.65 The 
prospects of an agreement chilled again, however, early in 2003, after 
differences between the two countries over Iraq. Not only did the Labour 
government not support the American intervention in Iraq, but Clark 
annoyed the American government by saying publicly that the war would 
not have occurred if Bush's Democratic opponent at the 2000 presidential 
election, Al Gore, had been president. The American embassy in New Zealand 
described the comment as "regrettable."66 Clark was forced to offer apologies 
after being told that her comments might damage the New Zealand lobbying 
effort in Washington. In May 2003, the American embassy stated that the 
United States was not prepared to enter into negotiations with New Zealand 
"at this time," though it did not rule out the possibility of such talks in the 
future.67 
Early in 2004, the United States concluded a trade deal with Australia. 
The concessions Australia obtained for agricultural products, however, were 
very limited, and finance minister Cullen said: "This is not the big bang FTA 
that everybody feared." His analysis was that it offered some gains for some 
parts of the Australian economy, but not huge gains overall and "certainly 
64 Armstrong, "Anzac spirit." 
65 New Zealand Herald, 10 December 2002, p. A3. 
66 New Zealand Herald, 5-6 April 2003, p. Al . 
67 Audrey Young, "US toughens trade stance," New Zealand Herald, 24-25 May 2003, p Al. 
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not huge damage to us as a result."68 The government vowed to continue its 
own efforts to negotiate an agreement, but did not expect any progress until 
after the 2004 presidential elections. 
The New Zealand government sought a free-trade agreement with two 
other countries - Thailand and China. Just before the 2003 APEC summit 
in Bangkok, Helen Clark announced that New Zealand would negotiate a 
deal with Thailand. In October 2003, when Chinese President Hu Jin-tao 
visited New Zealand, the government announced that the two governments 
would begin talks on a framework for trade and economic co-operation. 
This might lead on to a full free-trade agreement. Indeed, Helen Clark 
reportedly told a visiting Chinese official in early 2004 that she wanted New 
Zealand to be the first Western nation to achieve a free trade deal with China.69 
Negotiations opened between China and New Zealand in December 2004. 
Conclusion 
The Clark government's foreign policy has shown a strong Liberal 
Internationalist emphasis, as is traditional with Labour Party governments. 
The government was strong in its defence of both democracy in Fiji and 
human rights in Zimbabwe, and it spoke out firmly for Tibetan rights, 
although New Zealand has an important relationship with China. The Clark 
government has also consistently upheld the role of the United Nations, 
most notably with regard to Iraq, when New Zealand's friends and allies 
were taking a different line. The Labour government demonstrated its anti- 
militarism by radically restructuring the New Zealand defence force to focus 
on peacekeeping and disaster relief, and its commitment to free trade has 
been shown in its negotiation of free trade agreements with some fellow 
APEC members. The government has thus far performed well in all the 
areas that Liberal Internationalism emphasizes, and might well be seen as 
the most Liberal Internationalist government New Zealand has had so far. 
Three of the four previous Labour governments did not support free trade, 
and the one that did had a less robust record on human rights than Clark's. 
National governments have not been Liberal Internationalist governments. 
Like all governments, however, the Clark government has not been able 
to conduct a foreign policy completely consistent with its ideological outlook. 
Despite its anti-militarism, the Labour government offered military forces 
to the United States for its campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan, 
and later contributed a frigate to the multinational naval force interdicting 
terrorist movements in the Persian Gulf. The desirability of closer economic 
68 New Zealand Herald, 1 1 February 2004, p. A6. 
«w Fran O Sullivan, "World tirst tor NZ in China trade pledge, New Zealand Herald, 3 April ZUU4, 
p.Al. 
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partnerships with certain Asian countries has outweighed any qualms about 
their human rights records, and the lack of progress at the multilateral 
negotiations of the Doha round has led to a number of bilateral deals as a 
second-best option. The deviations from a Liberal Internationalist foreign 
policy have, nevertheless, been relatively few. 
Of the various elements of Liberal Internationalism in the Clark 
government's foreign policy, it would seem that support for the United 
Nations and the promotion of free trade are particularly strong, with anti- 
militarism and promotion of human rights being of slightly lesser importance. 
It is notable that these stronger elements are the ones that are also supported 
by the National Party, if perhaps not always to the same degree, and thus 
may be seen as national interests as well as ideological preferences. An 
emphasis on economic matters in foreign policy and support for international 
institutions are alleged characteristics of a small state's foreign policy, but 
the Labour government's anti-militarism and its promotion of human rights 
owe more to its Liberal Internationalist outlook than to New Zealand's size. 
The University ofWaikato, Hamilton, New Zealand, January 2005 
235 
This content downloaded from 130.217.128.202 on Thu, 14 Nov 2013 21:13:07 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
